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ABSTRACT
ALTERING STATE INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
CHECKING BEHAVIOR
Hannah E. Faleer, M.A.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Kevin D. Wu, Ph.D., Director
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a heterogeneous mental disorder characterized
by the presence of obsessions and compulsions that can have debilitating effects on the lives of
individuals affected by it. Whereas obsessions and compulsions can fixate on nearly any subject,
they tend to cluster around certain themes (e.g., cleaning, checking, symmetry). From a
cognitive-behavioral perspective, certain dysfunctional beliefs or attitudes are believed to
contribute to the etiology and maintenance of OCD. One of these beliefs is intolerance of
uncertainty (IU), the tendency for an individual to avoid ambiguous situations and view him or
herself as unable to cope in the face of uncertainty. It has been suggested that the manifestation
of particular compulsions may be affected by the presence of certain dysfunctional beliefs; IU
may be more highly implicated in specific OC symptoms, such as checking.
To date, research on IU primarily has been conducted in the context of generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD). Although there has been growing interest in IU in the OCD literature,
the majority of research has been correlational in nature. Moreover, few studies have examined
IU as a causal risk factor for checking compulsions. The current study manipulated IU through a
false-feedback paradigm and examined its effects on overestimation of threat (another cognitive
vulnerability believed to contribute to OCD), worry, and a computerized delayed matching-tosample task designed to measure checking behavior. By offering an experimental examination of

IU as a causal risk factor for the presence of checking behavior, this study contributes an
important step in understanding the effects of dysfunctional beliefs on compulsions in the
context of OCD.
Participants were 122 students who completed baseline questionnaires and a two-part IU
manipulation. In Phase 1, participants completed a modified IU questionnaire, rating each
statement as “true” or “false.” In the high IU condition, each statement was paired with the
qualifier “occasionally” to induce participants to endorse more items; in the low IU condition,
each statement was paired with the qualifier “almost always” to induce participants to endorse
fewer items. In Phase 2, participants received false feedback: participants in the high condition
received feedback that they do not tolerate certainty well; participants in the low condition
received the opposite feedback. Following the manipulation, participants completed a second
questionnaire battery and then engaged in a delayed matching-to-sample computerized task
which measured accuracy, response time, and number of checks.
Results indicated that conditions were significantly different on IU scores following the
manipulation (t(80) = 3.711, p < .001, d = .80) and participants endorsed significantly different
worry scores (t(81) = 2.25, p = .027). The experimental manipulation did not, however,
distinguish conditions on checking behavior. The conditions did not differ on task accuracy (t(80)
= .601, p = .55), response time (t(80) = -1.51, p = .14), or number of checks (t(77) = -.728, p = .46),
nor were conditions significantly different on threat estimation scores, (t(81) = 1.08, p = .28).
These results suggest that the IU manipulation was successful in altering IU levels for one of two
conditions and affecting worry, but it did not appear to have an effect on analog checking
behavior or threat estimation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: An Overview

OCD is a psychological disorder defined by the presence of obsessions and compulsions.
Obsessions are characterized as unwanted, intrusive thoughts that cause anxiety or stress.
Intrusive thoughts are disturbing for the individual and attempts are often made to suppress or
ignore them. Compulsions are repetitive behaviors that can be overt, including washing,
checking, and ordering; or they can be covert mental acts such as counting, canceling thoughts,
and praying (Franklin et al., 1998). Compulsions serve the purpose of neutralizing or reducing an
individual’s anxiety, even if they are not connected to the source of the anxiety in a realistic way
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). For example, an individual with an obsession
about a natural disaster may turn a light switch on and off to reduce anxiety and to prevent the
natural disaster from occurring.
Although it can be diagnosed at any age, on average, Obsessive-Compulsive (OC)
symptoms are first expressed around 19.5 years of age (APA, 2013). The rate of OCD in women
is slightly higher than in men, and epidemiological studies indicate that the lifetime prevalence
rate in the United States is 2.3% (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 2010). Further, Ruscio et al.
(2010) found that nearly 90% of their study respondents with OCD also had a comorbid disorder,
usually an anxiety disorder (75.8%) or mood disorder (63.3%). Individuals with OCD generally
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have high levels of impairment and distress; the obsessions and compulsions cause dysfunction
in daily living, and can lead to negative outcomes in social, employment, and romantic domains
(APA, 2013).
OCD is a heterogeneous disorder. Whereas obsessions and compulsions can fixate on
nearly any subject, they tend to cluster around certain themes, including cleaning, symmetry,
forbidden or taboo thoughts, and harm (APA, 2013). Cluster analysis of the Yale-Brown
Obsessive Compulsive Scale symptom checklist (YBOCS; Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, &
Mazure, 1989), a semi-structured clinical interview, has demonstrated specific symptom
dimensions of OCD: contamination/washing, checking, hoarding, and symmetry/ordering
(Abramowitz, Franklin, Schwartz, & Furr, 2003; Calamari et al., 2004). Similarly, analysis of the
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), an 18-item questionnaire in
which participants rate degree of distress from OCD symptoms in the past month, revealed six
symptom dimensions: checking, hoarding, neutralizing, obsessing, ordering, and washing
(Olatunji, Williams, Haslam, Abramowitz, & Tolin, 2008). More recently, principal components
analysis of the YBOCS has indicated five OCD symptom dimensions: hoarding,
contamination/cleaning, doubt/checking, symmetry/ordering, and unacceptable/taboo thoughts
(Brakoulias et al., 2013). Although other symptom dimensions have been identified, including
pure obsessions (i.e., obsessions absent compulsions), sexual/religious obsessions, and harming
obsessions, cluster analyses have indicated mixed evidence that these additional factors exist
(McKay et al., 2004). Notably, symptoms are not mutually exclusive, and individuals often
endorse more than one symptom type (e.g., an individual may endorse both washing and
checking compulsions; McKay et al., 2004). It should also be noted that as of 2013, hoarding is
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no longer conceptualized as a symptom of OCD; in the DSM-5, it is classified as a separate
disorder (APA, 2013).
Checking symptoms are among the most prevalent compulsions in OCD (Ball, Baer, &
Otto, 1996) with an estimated 46% of adults and children with OCD reporting symptoms of
compulsive checking (Rapoport, 1989). Checking behavior on its own can be functional and is
common in the general population, but in individuals with OCD, this behavior becomes timeconsuming, distressing, and causes significant interference in daily life (Radomsky, & Alcolado,
2010). Checking compulsions are characterized by pathological doubt reflecting extreme
uncertainty about a situation or a stimulus and are negatively reinforced through a short-term
reduction in anxiety symptoms (Tolin et al., 2001). Paradoxically, repeated checking does not
increase information accuracy or certainty, another reason the behavior is considered
dysfunctional (Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006). For example, an individual who checks the
stove repeatedly is not more certain that it has been turned off than an individual who has not
checked the stove. Because of maladaptive functioning and significant disruption in day-to-day
living, providing adequate and appropriate treatment is key to improving quality of life.
Previously considered a difficult disorder to treat, a number of psychological and
pharmacological treatments for OCD have been developed over the last 40 years (Abramowitz,
1997). The gold standard behavioral treatment for OCD is Exposure and Response Prevention
(ERP), a technique used in CBT for many types of anxiety disorders and phobias (Abramowitz,
Franklin, Zoellner, & DiBernardo, 2002). ERP for OCD consists of psychoeducation, exposure
to the distressing stimulus, and prevention of ritualistic behaviors after exposure (Abramowitz et
al., 2002). By engaging in repeated, prolonged exposure to feared stimuli, it is believed that
individuals learn to break erroneous associations and foster habituation (Foa & Kozak, 1986). It
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has been found that improvement rates for OCD with ERP treatment range from 50-70% (Öst,
Havnen, Hansen, & Kvale, 2015; Franklin, Abramowitz, Kozak, Levitt, & Foa, 2000). A study
conducted on 20 individuals diagnosed with OCD who were not responsive to medication found
that after 15 sessions of CBT by way of ERP, OCD severity, as measured by the YBOCS, was
significantly decreased (Tolin, Maltby, Diefenbach, Hannan, & Worhunsky, 2004). Similarly, a
meta-analysis comparing the efficacy of ERP and medication treatments for OCD found that
after 12 weeks of treatment, individuals who had received ERP differed significantly on YBOCS
scores from individuals who had received a placebo pill (Foa et al., 2005).
Despite being the gold standard of treatment, not all individuals with OCD respond to
ERP. In the meta-analysis by Foa et al. (2005), nearly 29% of individuals who began treatment
dropped out prematurely. An analysis of treatment in a clinical OC sample found that one-third
of participants receiving CBT were not classified as recovered (defined as a decrease in YBOCS
scores of at least 6 points post-treatment, and a final YBOCS score of 11 or less), while 41% of
those receiving ERP were not classified as recovered (Whittal, Thordarson, & McLean, 2004).
Additionally, even when treatment is considered successful, some individuals have lingering
symptoms (Abramowitz, 2002). Improvement is still needed in the treatment of OCD. As
checking is the most common compulsion in OCD, and the majority of participants in treatment
outcome studies display symptoms of either checking or washing, further investigation into
checking compulsions may be necessary to improve treatment (Ball, Baer, & Otto, 1996). It has
been suggested that one avenue for improvement may be through the incorporation of therapies
targeting dysfunctional beliefs (Starcevic & Brakoulias, 2008). Dysfunctional beliefs have been
shown to play a significant role in the etiology and maintenance of OC symptoms (Frost &
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Steketee, 2002). To fully understand OCD, it is necessary to consider these underlying
cognitions.

A Cognitive Behavioral Perspective

Beck’s (1976) cognitive specificity hypothesis forms the cornerstone of many
contemporary theoretical models of OCD, stating that psychopathology arises from different
forms of dysfunctional beliefs. This model encapsulates multiple disorders, including major
depressive disorder (MDD) and the phobias, but also can be applied to OCD and has laid the
groundwork for current cognitive models of the disorder. In 1997, the Obsessive Compulsive
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) published a review of the cognitive components of OCD
and suggested that OCD consists of cognitive vulnerabilities that play a role in symptom
expression and severity. Defined as dysfunctional beliefs or attitudes, cognitive vulnerabilities
can heighten the probability that a disorder will develop and may directly or indirectly contribute
to its maintenance. Importantly, while cognitive vulnerabilities are identified as trait-like in terms
of stability, they are malleable and can potentially be altered through intervention (Koerner &
Dugas, 2008). The OCCWG presented five dysfunctional beliefs they found most relevant to
OCD. These beliefs are: inflated responsibility, the over-importance of one’s thoughts, the
necessity to control one’s thoughts, overestimation of threat, and IU. Perfectionism was later
added as a sixth domain (OCCWG, 1997). In 2001, the OCCWG developed the Obsessive
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ), an 87-item measure intended to assess for the presence of these
dysfunctional beliefs.
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These belief domains are notably interrelated. Questionnaire-based studies have indicated
a relationship between threat estimation and IU, and perfectionism and IU (Bredemeier &
Berenbaum, 2008; Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Reuther et al., 2013). Because of
the intercorrelations among dysfunctional beliefs in OCD, the OCCWG (2005) used factor
analysis to modify the OBQ from 87 items to 44 items and from six to three dimensions:
Responsibility/Threat Estimation, Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty, and
Importance/Control of Thoughts. Despite the results of the factor analysis, however,
perfectionism and IU are considered to be distinct cognitive vulnerabilities. Perfectionism has
been defined as the belief that mistakes are unacceptable, and that a perfect solution to problems
exists, while IU is characterized by the necessity for certainty and the belief that ambiguity is
intolerable (OCCWG, 1997). Examining IU apart from perfectionism is worthwhile to clarify the
nature of this dysfunctional belief as well as answer the call for research into therapeutic
interventions with IU as the primary focus. Grayson (2010) argued that IU is the core of OCD,
and that to properly treat the disorder, it is vital for individuals with OCD to accept that
uncertainty is a part of life. Therefore, it is important for psychologists to continue to research IU
and incorporate findings into clinical practice to aid clients in coping with this cognitive
distortion.
Certain dysfunctional beliefs have been shown to be highly relevant to OC symptom
expression. For example, univariate linear regression models conducted on self-report data from
562 college students revealed that perfectionism, as measured by the OBQ-87, significantly
predicted ordering symptoms (b = .25, t = 3.83, p < .001) and neutralizing symptoms (b = .16, t =
2.44, p < .05), both of which were measured by the OCI-R (Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz,
2003b). The hypothesis that certain dysfunctional beliefs are implicated in the maintenance of
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specific OC symptoms has been gaining support (e.g., Julien, O’Connor, Aardema, & Todorov,
2006; OCCWG, 2005; Sookman & Pinard, 2002). Building on Salkovskis (1985), Rachman
(2002) proposed a cognitive theory of checking behavior, suggesting that individuals feel
compelled to check because they consider themselves personally responsible for preventing harm
and are uncertain that a threat has been eliminated. In this theory, compulsive checkers have a
heightened sense of responsibility for harm, in addition to a heightened perceived likelihood and
seriousness of harm. Increases in these three factors may lead to an increase in duration,
frequency, and intensity of checking behavior (Rachman, 2002). The implications of this
cognitive model suggest that in order to treat an individual with OCD, who, for example, may be
a compulsive checker, it is pertinent to address specific dysfunctional beliefs in the cognitive
model of OCD, including IU, responsibility, and overestimation of threat (Taylor, 2010).

Intolerance of Uncertainty

IU has been defined as “the way in which an individual perceives information in
uncertain situations and responds to this information with a set of cognitive, emotional and
behavioral reactions” (Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998, p. 141). Two specific
components of IU have been identified in some research studies: a desire for predictability (a
desire to know what will happen in future events), and uncertainty paralysis (the tendency to
freeze into inaction during uncertain events; Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008). Others have
defined IU by its association with danger; in essence, it is the ambiguity of a situation that makes
it dangerous because it could be harmful or intolerable (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001;
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Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998). Still others have described IU as a dispositional factor created
by negative beliefs (Koerner & Dugas, 2008).
The varied definitions of IU make it clear that it is a multi-faceted construct
encompassing multiple domains beyond just doubt. The OCCWG (1997) theorized that IU is a
dysfunctional belief composed of several core dimensions: (1) beliefs about the necessity of
certainty, (2) a view that the individual has a reduced ability to function in the face of change,
and (3) beliefs that the individual will be unable to manage in situations that are ambiguous.
Essentially, individuals with elevated IU may feel that they cannot appropriately cope in
ambiguous situations, and as a result, they require a high level of certainty in their lives. Further,
individuals with IU may have a difficult time with decision-making, and therefore could view
themselves as unable to deal with threatening situations that require problem solving (Gentes &
Ruscio, 2011). Because of the extensive research supporting it, the current study proceeded using
the OCCWG’s (1997) definition.

IU and OCD

In essence, IU motivates an individual toward actions that will increase control and
predictability. Elevated IU has been associated with OCD symptom frequency and distress
(Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006), and some research has indicated that IU is highly
associated with specific OC symptoms, including doubting and checking behaviors (Krohne,
1993; Lind & Boschen, 2009). The need for more investigations into IU as a causal risk factor
for certain anxiety disorders has been expressed (Carleton et al., 2012). IU has been shown to be
an OCD-relevant cognitive bias that may have an impact on symptom expression and severity.
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Others have argued that IU is more than just a dysfunctional belief; it is a central feature
of OCD and can be located at the heart of nearly every symptom of the disorder (Grayson, 2010).
Reed (1985) considered pathological doubt to be a core feature of OCD, leading an individual to
have clear concerns about his or her ability to be certain about and cope with danger. As such,
OC symptoms may develop as a mechanism to protect the individual from concerns about
uncertainty. For instance, Steketee et al. (1998) have argued that primary features of OCD,
including compulsions and ritualistic behaviors, are maintained by reducing discomfort from
uncertain and potentially threatening situations. Many years earlier, Beech and Liddell (1974)
hypothesized that ritualistic behaviors are negatively reinforced by reducing distress from
situations that are ambiguous, and therefore potentially dangerous. Conceptually, IU appears
highly related to OCD; the current study provides further investigation of this construct and its
relationship with OC symptoms.
It is critical to note that IU is by no means specific to OCD. A substantial amount of
research has found that IU is a transdiagnostic feature that underlies many anxiety disorders,
including GAD, MDD, social phobia, agoraphobia, and panic disorder (Carleton, et al., 2012;
Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). In fact, the majority of research on IU has
been done in the context of GAD (e.g., Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Kelly, 2009), a disorder
characterized by excessive and uncontrollable worry (APA, 2013).

IU and Checking Behavior

Whereas IU and OCD symptoms are correlated in general, it has been proposed that IU
may be more highly implicated in specific OC symptoms (Tolin et al., 2003a). It has been
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hypothesized that IU is more closely associated with checking symptoms than with washing
symptoms in OCD (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). The OCCWG (2005) administered the OBQ-44
and the Padua Inventory Revised (PI-WSUR; Burns, Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996; a
self-report measure that encompasses five content areas of OCD: thoughts about harm to oneself
or others, impulses to harm oneself or others, contamination obsessions and washing
compulsions, checking compulsions, and grooming compulsions) to a sample of 186 individuals
with OCD. Findings indicated that checking symptoms were more closely associated with the
Perfectionism/Certainty (PC) subscale of the OBQ-44 (r = .45) than the Responsibility/Threat
subscale (r = .27) and the Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale (r = .14). The PC subscale
had a greater association with checking, grooming (r = .43), and thoughts of harm to self or
others (r = .39) than impulse to harm others (r = .19) and contamination (r = .27). Further
support for the hypothesis that specific OC symptoms are associated with specific dysfunctional
beliefs can be found in a similar study on the OBQ-44 and PI-WSUR. Utilizing a sample of 126
OCD patients and controlling for depression and anxiety, the PC subscale significantly predicted
checking scores in a hierarchical regression analysis (β = .283, t = 3.09, p < .002; Julien et al.,
2006). In another study by Calamari, Wiegartz, and Janeck (1999) examining differences among
OC symptomatology, 106 participants with OCD were given the YBOCS and divided into
subgroups based on cluster analyses. These subgroups were characterized by harming, hoarding,
contamination, certainty, and obsessionals. Each participant then completed OC symptom
measures, including the Compulsive Activity Checklist (CAC; Freund, Steketee, & Foa, 1987)
and the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). The
certainty cluster, characterized by participants who needed absolute certainty about negative
outcomes, demonstrated significantly higher scores on checking and doubting scales on both the
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MOCI and the CAC than other subgroups. These data suggest that individuals with elevated
levels of IU may be more likely to have specific OC symptoms, like checking.

Behavioral checking measures

One way to examine these questions is through the use of behavioral tasks in the
laboratory, which have been developed to measure checking behavior and its relationship to
various OC-related outcomes. van Den Hout and Kindt (2003) created a virtual gas stove to
examine checking behavior and memory confidence. Participants completed a training phase and
then a pre-test phase, after which they rated how confident they were that they had turned off the
stove. Next, participants in the experimental condition were told that they would be checking a
gas stove on the computer and must turn it on and off according to directions, while participants
in the control condition turned on and off virtual light bulbs. Both groups recorded the number of
times they checked the stove/light bulb, and again rated how confident they were about which
stove rings/light bulbs had been checked. A two-way ANOVA on memory confidence showed a
main effect of group [F(1,37) = 8.2, p < 0.007], a main effect of time [F(1,37) = 18.3, p < .001) and
group by time interaction [F(1,37) = 6.3; p < .017]. These results indicate that participants in the
experimental condition reported significantly lower memory confidence scores that participants
in the control condition as time went on, even though memory accuracy was high in both groups.
Similarly, Radomsky and Alcolado (2010) used a behavioral task that involved checking a real
stove, and instructed participants to either physically or mentally check the stove. Participants
who repeatedly physically checked the stove had decreased meta-memory (memory confidence)
for their last physical check than participants who repeatedly mentally checked the stove [F(1, 58)
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= 12. 47, p < .001]. Participants who repeatedly mentally checked the stove had decreased metamemory for their last mental check than participants who repeatedly physically checked the
stove [F(1,58) = 12.15, p < .001]. The results of this study indicate that repeated physical checking
reduces memory confidence only for physical checks, whereas repeated mental checking only
reduces memory confidence for mental checks.
MacDonald and Davy (2005) examined the relationship between responsibility, checking,
and mood. A negative or positive mood was induced in participants through music and lighting.
Participants were then instructed to read over a text that had a large number of spelling errors
and make a note of every error they saw. The text consisted of 42 lines and 100 spelling and
punctuation errors, and once participants had read through the text once, they were given the
opportunity to read through it again, this time noting how many lines they checked. Participants
were sorted into groups in which they were either instructed to check until they had found as
many errors as possible, or they were instructed to check until they felt like stopping. Results
indicated that mood did not have a significant effect on checking perseveration, whereas
participants who were instructed to check for as many errors as possible demonstrated a
significantly higher total number of checks [F(1,59) = 7.8, p < .007] and more time spent checking
[F(1,59) = 14.6, p < .001] than the group that was instructed to check until they felt like stopping.
This study introduced a relatively easy-to-implement task to measure checking behavior, though
limitations of the task include a lack of feedback about checking accuracy and possible
participant fatigue from having to look for so many errors during a monotonous task.
Other research has focused specifically on the relationship between checking behavior
and IU. Tolin et al. (2003a) examined the relationship between IU and checking compulsions.
They theorized that pathological doubt, one component of IU, is a major factor in individuals
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with checking compulsions, as these individuals keep checking because they doubt they checked
correctly each previous time. The authors administered a number of measures to clinical OCD
checkers, clinical OCD non-checkers, and non-anxious controls, including the Structured
Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995), YBOCS, and the
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).
Results indicated that OC checkers scored higher on the IUS than both non-checkers and nonanxious controls. Repeating symptoms (performing the same act over and over) were also
correlated with IU. However, after averaging across all IUS scores, OCD patients did not show
evidence of higher IU symptoms than the controls, which provides some preliminary evidence
that only certain OCD compulsions may be driven by uncertainty.
Some research has incorporated technology to more effectively capture checking
behavior. Kim et al. (2010) created a virtual checking task in which the participant was equipped
with a head-mounted display and a joystick to engage with a virtual apartment. The sample
consisted of OC checkers, OC non-checkers, and healthy controls. Participants were instructed to
pretend they were in a real apartment and check all features of the apartment before leaving,
including a gas stove, light switches, and doors with locks. Significant group differences were
found on amount of time spent checking [F(2, 67) = 6.538, p < .05]. Post-hoc analyses revealed
that OC checkers (M = 154.43) displayed significantly more time (measured in seconds) spent
checking the virtual apartment than OC non-checkers (M = 107.14) and healthy controls (M =
98.62). Time spent checking was not significantly different, however, between OC non-checkers
and the healthy controls. Results of this study suggest it is an effective measure of checking
behavior, and was able to distinguish participants with a diagnosis of OCD and primary checking
compulsions from participants with a diagnosis of OCD with primary non-checking
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compulsions, and healthy controls. Though the implications of this virtual reality measure are
promising, the technology currently needed to conduct such a task is expensive, time consuming
to use, and may be confounded by participants’ inability to effectively manipulate the joystick.
A simpler behavioral measure was created by Rotge et al. (2008). The computerized
measure consists of a delayed matching-to-sample task. Participants were 36 adults with OCD,
14 adults without OCD, and 50 healthy controls. During the task, participants viewed an image
followed by a delay, followed by another image, and were instructed to indicate whether the
second image matched the first. They were given the opportunity to check the first image as
many times as they needed in order to be sure of their answer. The task was designed to assess
response time (time from when the matching image appeared to when the participants made a
choice), number of checks completed, and accuracy.
Significant group differences were found on number of checks completed [F(2,97) = 18.88,
p < .001] and response time [F(2,87) = 10.80, p < .001]. Post hoc analyses revealed that OC
checkers completed significantly more checks during the task than OC non-checkers (p < .02)
and that OC non-checkers completed significantly more checks than healthy controls (p < .02).
Response time was compared in trials with and without checking behaviors. In trials with
checking behaviors, significant group differences were found, F(2,87) = 9.57, p < .001, with posthoc analyses indicating that OC checkers had significantly longer response times than healthy
controls (p < .002) but OC non-checkers did not (p > .05). In trials without checking behaviors,
significant group differences were again found, F(2,87) = 7.18, p < .001, and post-hoc tests
demonstrated that the response time for OC checkers and OC non-checkers was significantly
longer than healthy controls (p < .01 and .02, respectfully). Further, the OC checkers showed the
greatest increase in response time from trials without checking behavior to trials with checking
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behavior. No significant group differences on accuracy were found, F(2,97) = .04, p > .05. The
task was successful in measuring checking behavior in a mixed sample. OC checkers engaged in
a higher number of checks and had longer response times than healthy controls, though all
groups displayed similar accuracy. The results of this study indicate that checking behavior can
be measured efficiently in both time and cost, as well as eliminate some of the limitations of
other behavioral measures, including the difficulty of getting participants to believe the task is
real (e.g. turning off a stove so that the building does not burn down).
The current body of research indicates that IU is related to checking behavior. Behavioral
checking tasks indicate that checking perseveration can be measured, though the task itself tends
to be more successful when it is meaningful and provides some consequence for failing to check
(Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). However, most of the current research relies on self-report
measures of IU, and the correlational nature of this research makes it difficult to make
conclusions about causality or maintaining factors. In order to further understand the relationship
between IU and checking symptoms, a necessary step is to experimentally measure IU and its
impact on a behavioral checking task. If Rachman’s (2002) theory is correct, IU should be highly
correlated with repeated checking on a behavioral task.

IU and Worry

As a construct, IU cannot and should not be thought of as operating in isolation. In other
words, because IU is considered to be an underlying dysfunctional belief in both GAD and OCD,
it considered to be strongly related to additional major components of these disorders, including
threat estimation and worry.
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Worry is defined as “negatively valenced verbal thought activity” that interferes with
emotional processing and serves as a cognitive avoidance response to potential threats
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998). Individuals may view worry as an adaptive attempt to problem
solve, when in reality it may be impeding habituation and extinction of the feared outcome
(Borkovec et al., 2004). Though worry and IU seem similar conceptually, IU is considered a
cognitive vulnerability for the manifestation of anxiety symptoms, which include worry
(Freeston et al., 1994). It has been suggested that IU may be instrumental in the etiology and
maintenance of worry (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000), though the nature of this
relationship is still under investigation. Worry has been consistently correlated with IU in both
clinical and non-clinical samples, even when levels of anxiety and depression are controlled
(Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston et al., 1994). In one study of these constructs,
worry, as measured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, &
Borkovec, 1990), was strongly correlated with IU, as measured by the IUS, r = .70, p < .001
(Dugas et al., 1997). Dugas, Gosselin, and Ladouceur (2001) examined the specificity of the
relationship between worry and IU via hierarchical regression. They found that IU accounted for
42% of the variance in worry scores beyond what was accounted for by other variables, such as
responsibility and anxiety sensitivity.
These constructs have also been measured beyond questionnaire-based studies. Research
has indicated that experimentally increasing levels of IU leads to increases in worry (Kelly,
2009; Ladouceur et al., 2000). As such, it has been speculated that IU and worry are causally
linked; in essence, IU leads to worry (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Meeten, Dash, Scarlet, &
Davy, 2012). In fact, cognitive-behavioral models of worry include IU as an essential component
(Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). Because worry is a core feature of GAD, the
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relationship between worry and IU primarily has been examined in the GAD literature (APA,
2013). The strong relationship between the two constructs indicates that it may be valuable to
include a measure of worry in any experimental manipulation of IU. If the experimental
manipulation of IU increases worry, it is a sign that the experiment is manipulating the same
construct that is being examined in the GAD literature, and supports the theory that IU causes
worry.

IU and Overestimation of Threat

It has been hypothesized that the causal relationship between IU and worry occurs
through two paths. First, increases in IU lead to negative problem orientation (i.e., dysfunctional
attitudes regarding problem solving), mental avoidance, and views that worry is an effective
coping strategy with positive consequences. Second, IU may lead to worry by increasing threat
estimation (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). Overestimation of threat is defined as
“exaggeration of the probability or severity of harm” (OCCWG, 1997, p. 678) and it is
considered a dysfunctional belief in OCD. In fact, Carr (1974) considered overestimation of
threat to be one of the main causal factors of the disorder, hypothesizing that errors in judgment
of cost and probability estimates of negative outcomes lead to OCD.
It has been suggested that IU and threat estimation are highly related (OCCWG, 2003).
Steketee et al. (1998) created a questionnaire to assess six cognitive domains in OCD
(responsibility for harm, control of thoughts, threat estimation, tolerance for uncertainty, beliefs
about discomfort/anxiety, and beliefs about coping), called the Obsessive-Compulsive Beliefs
Questionnaire (OCBQ). The OCBQ consists of 90 items and each of the six subscales
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demonstrated internal consistency, including threat estimation (α = .88) and tolerance for
uncertainty (α = .87). The threat estimation subscale and the IU subscale were highly correlated
(r = .82), though this may have been a result of construct overlap in the measure (correlations
between subscales ranged from .57-.82). The relationship between IU and threat estimation has
implications for OCD. Individuals with OCD tend to be excessively fearful of harm and view
situations as dangerous until proven safe (Steketee et al., 1998). In addition, research has found
that anxious individuals, compared to non-anxious controls, view future negative events as being
more likely to occur and having greater consequences (Butler & Matthews, 1983; McNally &
Foa, 1987). It is possible that IU may be contributing to the maintenance and severity of both
GAD and OCD through overestimation of threat, and in turn, exacerbating worry, or obsessions
and compulsions.
In the GAD literature, there have also been findings that IU and threat estimation are
related. Bredemeier and Berenbaum (2008) suggested that threat estimation consists of both
increased probability estimates of a negative event occurring and increased cost estimates of
negative outcomes. They examined two components of IU in a non-clinical sample and
administered a 7-item desire for predictability subscale and a 7-item uncertainty paralysis
subscale consisting of items from the IUS. Previous research has demonstrated convergent and
discriminant validity for these scales (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2008). Threat
estimation was also examined using a 39-item measure consisting of possible future negative
events. Participants were asked to rate “how bad” it would be if these events occurred and “how
likely” they thought the events were to occur on two separate 1-6 scales. Higher scores indicated
higher cost estimates and higher probability estimates for future negative events and therefore
higher threat estimation. Results of a multiple regression analysis indicated that the desire for
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predictability subscale and uncertainty paralysis subscale were significantly associated with cost
estimates of future negative events (R2 = .15, p < .01). Both subscales were also significantly
associated with probability estimates of future negative outcomes in the overall regression model
(R2 = .10, p < .01). The results of this study suggest that individuals high in desire for
predictability and uncertainty paralysis, core components of IU, tend to overestimate the
probability and cost of negative consequences of uncertain outcomes. These findings indicate
that IU and threat estimation are related, though further examination of the components of threat
estimation is needed.
Threat estimation is thought to be enhanced through IU by allowing individuals to
misjudge the probability of negative events occurring, and also misinterpret the consequences of
those events (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Dugas et al 2004; MacLeod, Williams, &
Bekerian, 1991). These factors may have a more complex relationship with OCD than previously
thought. In order to understand how threat estimation relates to IU and the maintenance of OCD,
it is important to have an understanding of its components. Woods, Frost, and Steketee (2002)
examined threat estimation in OCD patients and college students. Participants were asked to
complete an idiographic questionnaire about future negative events and rate how likely they
thought the event would be to occur, how severe the consequences would be, and how well they
believed they could cope with the event. They found a significant relationship between OC
symptoms and each of the severity, probability, and coping subscales in the student sample, and
significant correlations between OC symptoms and the severity and coping subscales in the
patient sample. Severity estimations increased as OC symptoms increased, with a large effect
size (d = .51) for the student sample and a moderate effect size (d = .34) for the patient sample.
The results of this study suggest that there is a strong relationship between cost estimates of
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negative events and OC symptom severity. Probability estimates, however, showed a more
complex relationship with OC symptoms: in the student sample, probability estimates and OC
symptoms were significantly related, but this relationship did not hold in the clinical sample.
These findings indicate that probability estimates in OC patients may be more complex than
previously thought. Even if individuals are aware that the probability of a negative event
occurring is low, they may still be troubled by it. This study provides evidence that a relationship
between OC symptoms and cost estimates in threat estimation exists in both clinical and student
samples. Finally, Rachman (2002) proposed uncertainty of danger or threat as a factor in
compulsive checking. IU and threat estimation may be contributing to checking behaviors. For
example, individuals may engage in checking and ritualistic behavior to reestablish certainty and
reduce the distress caused by potentially dangerous situations (Tolin et al., 2003a).
Current IU and threat estimation research has limitations. Woods et al. (2002) had
participants write down future negative events that were salient to them and then rate the cost
and probability of their chosen events. Although this may have increased ecological validity,
internal validity was reduced by increasing the variation in negative events. The relationship
between OC symptoms and future negative events may appear different when a meaningful
nomothetic approach is taken and participants are asked to rate identical outcomes. Furthermore,
many of these studies collected data using questionnaires and written responses. Whereas current
studies on threat estimation and IU are useful in determining a positive relationship between IU
and cost estimates, they do not provide evidence of causality. Additionally, much of the current
literature was conducted in the context of GAD. Further examination of the relationship between
threat estimation and IU by utilizing an OCD framework is warranted and will allow for a more
complete understanding of IU.
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Current IU Manipulations

Although there have been a number of behavioral tasks used to assess checking behavior,
experimental manipulations involving IU are relatively scarce, and those involving OCD are
scarcer still. In the GAD literature, a handful of IU manipulations have been created. Ladouceur,
Gosselin, and Dugas (2000) developed the first manipulation to determine if a causal relationship
existed between IU and worry. In their IU manipulation, participants were asked to play a
computerized roulette game. They were told that money would be donated to a (fictitious)
Foundation if they made a certain amount of money on the game, though in actuality the game
was fixed and all participants ended with the same amount. Throughout the game, researchers
would make comments intended to increase IU (noting that the chances of winning were lower
and that most participants were not doing well) or decrease IU (noting that the chances of
winning were high and that the task was just a game so winning was not very important). IU and
worry levels were measured after the roulette task was completed. The results of the study
indicated that there were significantly higher levels of worry and concern about the Foundation
in the high IU group (M = 37.81, SD = 7.58) than the low IU group (M = 19.71, SD = 8.55), t(40)
= 7.26, p < .05. Experimentally manipulated greater IU also led to higher levels of worry.
This study has limitations, especially regarding the experimental manipulation of IU.
Though the manipulation check of IU was successful, it is unclear if IU as a construct was in fact
being manipulated. It is possible that group differences on the manipulation check were caused
by variations in expectations of success, rather than IU. In the study, it appears that researchers
either downplayed the importance of success or tried to increase it, but this may not have
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affected uncertainty at all. It is possible that researchers were actually manipulating
responsibility levels, rather than certainty/uncertainty. As with Bredemeier and Berenbaum
(2008), this study’s main focus was on GAD and worry. Experimental manipulations of IU in the
context of other disorders will expand the knowledge base and may uncover facets of IU not
apparent through a GAD-specific lens. Because relatively few experiments on IU have been
conducted, this study provides important insight into the difficulties of manipulating this
variable.
Another experimental manipulation of IU was developed by Kelly (2009). In this
manipulation, 60 Australian undergraduate participants were told they were completing a
memory task. They were randomly sorted into a high IU group or a low IU group. In the high IU
group, participants were asked to read two vignettes about a character (Sarah or Sean) in
uncertain situations regarding dating and finances. They were then asked to write a story about a
time in their own lives when they were uncertain of the outcome of a situation. Afterward,
participants were asked to memorize the story they just wrote from the perspective of Sarah or
Sean from the vignettes. Following the IU manipulation, participants completed questionnaires
intended to measure worry and IU. Kelly (2009) found that the manipulation was successful in
that there was a significant difference in IU levels following the manipulation between the high
group (M = 30.00, SD = 8.60) and the low group (M = 24.70, SD = 6.01), t(58) = 2.77, p < .05.
This study was an important step in expanding the scope of research conducted on IU. By
instructing participants to write a personally relevant description of uncertainty, it provided a
new framework for manipulating IU that eliminates artificial scenarios and thus increases
ecological validity. However, the manipulation, conducted in Australia, likely is not
generalizable to American populations because of certain cultural differences in the vignettes.
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For example, in the finance vignette, the Sarah/Sean must face uncertainty regarding
superannuation (an Australian system set up to allow citizens to save for retirement), which does
not directly translate to financial opportunities in the United States. The manipulation is also
time-consuming—nearly 50 minutes—and therefore may not be ideal for a study incorporating
additional tasks.
Meeten, Dash, Scarlet, and Davy (2012) examined IU in an attempt to determine if a
causal relationship between worry and IU exists. After obtaining consent, the authors presented
participants with baseline measures, including the IUS short form (Carleton, Norton, &
Asmundson, 2007), the PSWQ, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith,
1983), and a visual analogue scale (VAS) mood measure. The authors experimentally
manipulated IU using the procedure created by Kelly (2009). Participants were then given a
manipulation check consisting of three VAS questions designed to assess negative beliefs about
uncertainty regarding the situation they described in the Kelly (2009) procedures, general beliefs
about uncertainty, and current level of uncertainty. After the manipulation check, participants
received two more VAS mood measures, and then participated in a catastrophizing interview in
which they were asked a series of questions about a personal worry (i.e., “what is it that worries
you about X?”). Researchers measured the number of questions participants answered before
ending the interview. The more questions participants answered, the higher their worry levels.
Once the catastrophizing interview was over, participants completed three more mood measures
and finished with debriefing. An independent samples t test was conducted on the IU
manipulation check questions, and the results indicated that the high group (M = 171.20, SD =
55.77) had significantly greater IU levels than the low group (M = 122.67, SD = 75.17), t(44) =
2.45, p < .02. Additionally, the experimentally manipulated high IU group took significantly
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more catastrophizing steps in the interview than the low IU group, t(44) = 3.37, p < .002, and had
higher levels of sadness (M = 29.27) than the low IU group (M = 17.59), F(1, 44) = 4.30, p < .04.
Rosen and Knäuper (2009) created an IU manipulation based on a linguistic task. The
protocol is based on the theory that if participants answer a question in a particular way (e.g.,
affirmatively) they will begin to develop cognitions that affect their attitudes or traits (Salancik
& Conway, 1975). In essence, if participants endorse a number of items about a particular trait,
such as IU, they will begin to believe that the trait is characteristic of them, and act in a manner
consistent with that trait. Rosen and Knäuper (2009) manipulated the questionnaires participants
received, so that the high IU group had a higher probability of endorsing items, while a low IU
group had a lower probability of endorsing items. The IU manipulation has proven successful at
altering dysfunctional beliefs in undergraduate college students at multiple universities (Bailey,
Fergus, & Wu, 2013; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). Rosen and Knäuper (2009) created zstandardized scores and conducted a paired samples t test, and found that there was a significant
increase in IU scores from baseline to post-manipulation in the high group, t(56) = 2.52, p = .02;
and a significant decrease in IU scores from baseline to post-manipulation in the low group, t(87)
= –5.34, p < .01. Bailey et al. (2013) also found that the manipulation was successful at altering
IU; the high IU group had higher IU scores (as measured by the OBQ-87 IU subscale) than the
low group post-manipulation, controlling for pre-manipulation IU scores [F(1,80) = 10.27, p =
.002]. This manipulation is short, cost-effective, and relatively easy to implement in an
experimental setting involving other tasks for participants to complete. Because of the success of
the manipulation at altering participants’ IU levels, this manipulation was incorporated into the
current study.
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These experiments provide an important first step in expanding research on IU beyond
questionnaires and self-report data. However, further research needs to be conducted to
determine if experimentally manipulated IU is related to OC symptoms, such as checking
behavior, as well as to expand the scope of research and increase understanding of this
dysfunctional belief domain.

Limitations to Existing Literature

The existing research on IU, threat estimation, and checking suffers from a number of
limitations. First, much of the data collected on IU and checking behavior have come exclusively
from self-report measures, which may be subject to bias. The experimental research that has been
conducted on IU is almost entirely in the context of GAD, even though IU has been linked with
numerous anxiety disorders and depression. Additionally, some of the checking tasks
implemented did not have consequences for failing to check, and this may have biased the results
because participants may not have felt that checking was necessary. Finally, research involving
threat estimation in terms of IU has been mixed because of a paucity of psychometrically sound
instruments available to measure overestimation of threat. Therefore, a study that significantly
increases or decreases state IU, utilizes a behavioral checking task that is easy to use and
understand, and implements a psychometrically validated measure of threat estimation is
warranted.
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Current Study

The current study replicated and extended previous OCD research. Specifically, this
study sought to explore the relationship between IU and analog checking behavior, threat
estimation, and worry. IU was experimentally manipulated utilizing Rosen and Knäuper’s (2009)
procedure. The effects of the manipulation on checking behavior were measured using a
computerized checking task (Rotge et al., 2008). Finally, measuring worry and threat estimation
allowed for further exploration of IU as a construct.
The current study had three primary aims. First, this study sought to examine the impact
of IU on checking behavior. Previous research suggests that IU is one of the primary cognitive
distortions involved in the etiology and maintenance of checking compulsions (e.g., Tolin et al.,
2003a). However, few studies have examined if this causal relationship or have implemented an
experimental paradigm. Second, this study sought to further explore the relationship between
threat estimation and IU by utilizing an OCD framework. Third, this study sought to examine the
relationship between IU and worry to determine specificity among constructs. Therefore, it was
hypothesized that, compared to participants manipulated to endorse lower IU, participants
manipulated to endorse higher IU would demonstrate: a greater number of checks (Hypothesis
1), greater response time on the checking task (Hypothesis 2), similar accuracy on the checking
task (Hypothesis 3), greater estimation of threat (Hypothesis 4), and greater worry (Hypothesis
5). Evidence substantiating these hypotheses would provide further support for cognitive models
of dysfunctional beliefs as being causally related to OCD, and may have implications for the
treatment of individuals with checking compulsions.

CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Participants

Participants were 122 undergraduate students recruited from an introductory psychology
course at Northern Illinois University (NIU). Three participants (2% of the sample) were
removed from analysis for incorrectly answering all three validity items, indicating they were
responding in a careless or intentionally false manner (74% of the sample answered all three
validity items correctly). Next, participants who did not believe the deception were removed
from analysis; 33 participants (27% of the sample) scored a 3 or lower on the manipulation
check, indicating that they did not believe the feedback. Three participants were removed from
analysis for responding in such a way that they received the wrong feedback (i.e., answering too
few questions as true in the high condition or too many questions as true in the low condition).
One participant was removed from analysis due to technical errors that prevented completion of
the E-Prime computerized task. The final sample size was 83. The sample was predominantly
female (60.2%) with a mean age of 19.29 (range 18 – 30). All but two participants identified
their race; of those, 44.6% identified as White/Caucasian, 31.3% identified as Black/African
American, 6% identified as Asian American, 1.2% identified as Native American, 6% identified
as multi-racial, and 8.4% identified as “other.” Additionally, 15.5% of the sample identified as
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Hispanic or Latino/a. Participants who were removed from analysis did not differ from those
retained on any demographic variable.

Measures1

OC Dysfunctional Beliefs

The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994) and the Need for
Closure Scale (NFCS, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) were used for the current study
manipulation. The current study followed the protocol of Rosen and Knäuper (2009),
administering the IUS and eight items from the NFCS as part of the IU manipulation (described
in the Procedure). The IUS is a 27-item questionnaire, originally developed for and validated on
French speaking populations. The English version was created by using two independent
translators and then back-translating it to French to ensure that problem areas had been identified
(Vallerand, 1989). Once it had been translated into English, Buhr and Dugas (2002) conducted
an analysis to test its psychometric properties and identified a 4-factor structure, though they
found that the factors were highly intercorrelated. These four factors are: that uncertainty is
stressful and upsetting, uncertainty leads to the inability to act, uncertainty should be avoided,

1

Permission was granted for use of the NFCS and the PSWQ through the Measurement
Instrument Database for the Social Sciences and IUS through the website of Michael J. Dugas.
Permission was obtained to use the computerized checking task from Jean Yves Rotge, the
author of the task. The OBQ-87 is in the public domain, and is therefore available for use
without permission. Permission to use the IUI was granted by Nicolas Carleton, the author of the
measure. Permission to use the BIDR was granted by Delroy Paulhus, the author of the measure.
All measures included in the proposed study are copyrighted and not for pay.
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and uncertainty is unfair. Because of the high intercorrelations among the factors and overlap of
some items, Buhr and Dugas suggest that only the total score be used.
In the original IUS, participants are asked to rate items on a 5-point scale, with 1 = not at
all characteristic of me, and 5 = entirely characteristic of me (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). For the
purposes of the manipulation in the current study, participants were asked to rate items as either
true or false (Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). Items on the IUS include ideas about the unacceptability
of uncertainty, the stress and frustration caused by uncertainty, and the inability to take action in
times of uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Questions on the IUS include, “One should always
look ahead to avoid surprises,” and “When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well” (Freeston
et al., 1994). The IUS has demonstrated internal consistency (α = .94) and 5-week test-retest
reliability in English-speaking samples (r = .72; Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The IUS has also
demonstrated convergent validity, correlating with measures of anxiety (Beck Anxiety
Inventory; r = .55, p < .001), depression (Beck Depression Inventory-II; r = .59, p < .001), and
worry (PSWQ; r = .60, p < .001), but not with age (r = -.06, p > .05) or gender (r = -.10, p > .05).
Following the protocol of Rosen and Knäuper (2009), the preference for predictability
subscale from the NFCS was added to the IUS. This modification was made due to criticism that
the IUS evaluates the consequences of uncertainty, but does not adequately assess the
unacceptability of uncertainty. The preference for predictability subscale of the NFCS was
therefore added to ensure sufficient manipulation of IU. This subscale consists of eight items.
Items on the subscale include “I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can
expect from it.” The preference for predictability subscale showed internal consistency (α = .79)
and 12-week test-retest reliability for the full NFCS (r = .86; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Internal consistency was high for the combined NFCS/IUS pre-manipulation (α = .92) and post
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manipulation (α = .86; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). Subsequent references to the IUS include the
preference for predictability subscale from the NFCS.
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Index-Part A (IUI-A; Gosselin et al., 2008; English
translation, Carleton, Gosselin, & Asmundson, 2010) was developed as a 2-part scale. Part A
measures an individual’s tendency to consider life’s uncertainties to be unacceptable, and Part B
measures manifestations of uncertainty, such as avoidance, doubt, and worry. The IUI-A consists
of 15 items with option responses ranging from 1 = not at all characteristic of me to 5 = entirely
characteristic of me. Higher scores indicate higher levels of IU. Examples of items include “I
find it unbearable to not have guarantees in life” and “I do not really tolerate situations in which I
do not know what is going on.” The scale, developed for and validated on a French-speaking
population, consists of a unifactorial structure and demonstrates internal consistency (α = .94).
The scale also shows adequate test-retest reliability over a 5-week period (r = .76; Gosselin et al.,
2008). The scale was later translated into English and psychometrically validated on a nonclinical population, with analyses again supporting a unitary factor structure and internal
consistency (α = .96; Carleton et al., 2010). The IUS and IUI-A are also correlated (r = .68;
Gosselin et al., 2008). For the purposes of this study, only Part A was necessary to measure
whether the manipulation was successful at increasing or decreasing IU.
The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire 87, threat estimation subscale (OBQ-T; OCCWG,
2001, 2003) was used to measure threat estimation. In 1997, OCCWG identified six
dysfunctional beliefs that may lead an individual to be at risk for OCD. Later, they developed the
OBQ to assess these beliefs in individuals. This measure consists of 87 items in which
participants are asked to rate how much they agree with an item on a 7-point scale (1 = disagree
very much, 7 = agree very much). Participants are instructed to select the item that best describes
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how they usually think most of the time. Subscales of the OBQ include Control of thoughts (14
items), Importance of thoughts (14 items), Responsibility (16 items), IU (13 items),
Overestimation of threat (14 items), and Perfectionism (16 items). The OBQ-T was intended to
measure the exaggeration of the probability and severity of harm, and higher scores on this
subscale indicate higher levels of this dysfunctional belief are present (OCCWG, 1997, 2001). A
sample item from this subscale is “Harmful events will happen unless I am very careful.”
OCCWG (2001) tested and validated the OBQ-87 on a number of groups, including
patients with OCD, anxious controls, student samples, and community controls. A large
percentage of the participants identified as White (students = 87.5%). The OBQ-T has
demonstrated internal consistency for student controls (α = .88) and OCD patients (α = .91). The
subscale also demonstrated test-retest reliability for students (r = .75), even though the
assessments were 2 to 3 months apart. The OBQ-T was highly correlated with the IU subscale
and the Responsibility subscale (rs near .80). Because patients with OCD did not score higher on
the OBQ-T than patients with general anxiety, overestimation of threat is considered to be OCrelevant, but not OC-specific.
The OBQ-87 was revised based on structural analyses (OCCWG 2003, 2005). The
revised measure contains 44 items and three scales (reduced from six). In the OBQ-44, threat
estimation and responsibility are combined into one scale. Despite the findings of the OCCWG
and their psychometric analysis on the OBQ, it is theoretically relevant to measure threat
estimation as distinct from responsibility, given the hypothesized role of threat estimation on
checking behavior. Currently, no known threat estimation measures exist to measure this
dysfunctional belief except the OBQ-T. Given the limitations, the OBQ-T provides the best
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opportunity to measure threat estimation in this study. In order to examine for specificity, the full
OBQ-87 was given, and subscale correlations were assessed.

Worry

The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) is the most widely used
measure of worry (Fresco, Heimberg, Mennin, & Turk, 2002). The PSWQ is a 16-item
questionnaire that measures participants’ responses on a 1-5 scale, with response options ranging
from 1 = not at all typical of me to 5 = very typical of me (Meyer et al., 1990). The possible
range of total scores is 16 to 80, and higher scores indicate higher levels of worry (Meyer et al.,
1990). Eleven of the questions are worded so that the participant may endorse worry (“When I
am under pressure, I worry a lot”), while five items are worded so that the participant may
endorse lack of worry (“I tend not to worry about things”), the latter of which are reverse coded
for scoring purposes. While some researchers have concluded that the PSWQ consists of a
unifactorial structure (Brown, 2003), others determined that a 2-factor structure provides a
superior fit (Fresco et al., 2002). These factors coincide with the way the questions are worded:
the Worry Engagement Scale consists of the eleven positive endorsements of worry, while the
Absence of Worry Scale consists of the five negatively endorsed worry items (Fresco et al.,
2002). These factors may exist as a result of method variance, that is, participants may be
answering the negatively worded items differently than the positively worded items. Further
research on this structure has concluded that the PSWQ is measuring a single construct (worry),
and that the five negatively-worded items do not represent a distinct factor (Hazlett-Stevens,
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Ullman, & Craske, 2004). For the purposes of the current study, worry was treated as a
unidimensional construct.
Estimates of internal consistency for the PSWQ total score typically are at or above .90 in
student samples (α = .94; Meyer et al., 1990; α = .90, Fresco et al., 2002). Fresco et al. (2002)
found that the Worry Engagement Scale had higher internal consistency (α = .94) than the total
score and suggested that the scale may be a good test of worry behavior on its own. Test-retest
reliability was indicated to be quite high in student samples (r = .92; Meyer et al., 1990). Followup studies revealed that the PSWQ was able to distinguish between students with GAD and
students with PTSD, and students with more severe GAD scored higher on the measure (Meyer
et al., 1990). Additionally, the PSWQ is able to distinguish participants with GAD from other
groups; participants with GAD scored significantly higher on the PSWQ than participants with
other anxiety disorders as well as healthy controls, F(6,341) = 21.60, p < .001 (Brown, Antony, &
Barlow, 1992).The measure has also displayed convergent and discriminant validity in both
clinical and non-clinical populations (Meyer et al., 1990). It has demonstrated a correlation of .55
with the Student Worry Scale (Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992) and a correlation of
.63 with the Worry Domains Questionnaire (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992). Brown et al.
(1992) reported that the PSWQ demonstrated discriminant validity in GAD patients: scores on
the PSWQ did not significantly correlate to measures of anxiety (Self-Analysis Questionnaire,
Anxiety Subscale [SAQ; Lovibond, 1983], r = 0.11; Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale [Hamilton,
1959], r = -0.02) or depression (SAQ Depression Subscale, r = 0.15; Hamilton Rating Scale for
Depression [Hamilton, 1960], r = 0.04). The PSWQ has also been correlated with other
measures, including measures of trait and state anxiety, as well as measures of low thrill-seeking
and problem avoidance (Meyer et al., 1990). In student samples, correlations between the PSWQ
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and other measures have been much higher than in patient samples (Fresco et al., 2002). Items in
the PSWQ are not content specific, which is valuable for obtaining a general measure of worry,
as opposed to a measure of worry in particular situations. Utilizing a general measure of worry
may increase the ecological validity of the current study.

Response Characteristics

The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1988) is a measure
created to assess for bias in participant responding, specifically, if participant responses are a
function of social pressure rather than true feelings. It contains two primary subscales: selfdeceptive enhancement and impression management. The BIDR consists of 40 items measured
on a 7-point scale (1 = not true, 7 = very true). The self-deceptive enhancement subscale
consists of twenty items that measure unconscious deception (“I am a completely rational
person”), whereas the impression management subscale consists of twenty items that measure
conscious deception (“Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke”). Twenty of the items are reverse
scored. The possible range of scores is 0-20, with a point added for each extreme score indicated
(6 or 7). High scores indicate exaggerated socially desirable responding.
The BIDR has demonstrated internal consistency in samples of college students and
religious adults (α = .83; Paulhus, 1988). It has also demonstrated 5-week test-retest reliability
for the self-deception enhancement scale (r = .69) and the impression management scale (r =
.65). The BIDR shows concurrent validity with the Marlowe-Crowne Scale (r = .71; Crowne &
Marlowe, 1960). The self-deceptive enhancement scale (r = .43) and the impression management
scale (r = .61) were found to correlate with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
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(MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1943) lie scale in a group of 103 undergraduate students
(Lanyon & Carle, 2007). The subscales have also been shown to form separate factors in factor
analysis (Paulhus, 1988).
To ensure participants were not responding in a careless or intentionally false manner,
three validity items were included in the current study (adapted from Bailey & Wu, 2013). The
validity items were “Choose the sum of three plus three;” “I have experienced a fatal heart attack
while watching television;” and “If you are paying attention right now, choose “8” as your
answer.” Research suggests that participants who incorrectly answer all three validity items have
significantly higher total scores on most measures than those who get fewer than three incorrect
(Bailey & Wu, 2013).

Demographic Characteristics

The Demographic Data Questionnaire (DDQ). The DDQ is 9-item self-report
questionnaire assessing basic demographic information. Individuals were asked questions about
their sex, age, and race. Additionally, participants were asked a brief set of questions to assess
their vision and to determine if they have received current or past psychological or psychiatric
treatment.
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Procedure

Participants were greeted by a session proctor and given information about the purpose of
the study, the study procedure, and participant rights; and provided written informed consent. All
participants completed the demographics questionnaire as well as the IUI-A and BIDR on a
computer. After completing the questionnaires, participants were randomized into a high- or lowIU condition. Participants completed the IU manipulation following the protocol by Rosen and
Knäuper (2009). The IU manipulation is as follows: all participants were given a short paragraph
to read about IU. Next, participants in the high condition were given a modified version of the
IUS and asked to rate each statement as “true” or “false.” The more statements that participants
endorse as “true,” the higher their IU. For participants in the high IU condition, each statement
was paired with the qualifier “occasionally” so that participants were more likely to endorse a
greater number of items. Participants in the low IU condition received the same questionnaire,
except that the statements were paired with the qualifier “almost always” to reduce the number
of items they endorsed.
In the second part of the manipulation, participants were given false feedback regarding
their levels of IU. This feedback was based on cut-off points for each condition; participants in
the high condition needed to endorse 5 or more statements to receive the high IU feedback, while
participants in the low condition had to endorse fewer than 24 statements to receive the low IU
feedback. During high IU feedback, participants read that they do not tolerate uncertainty well
and that they find uncertainty unfair. Feedback for the low IU manipulation was the opposite,
that they are tolerant of uncertainty. Rosen and Knäuper (2009) found that this manipulation was
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successful as measured by the IUS; participants in the high condition had significantly increased
IU from baseline while participants in the low IU condition had significantly decreased IU from
baseline. Another study conducted by Bailey, Fergus, and Wu (2013) found similar results using
the same manipulation but measuring IU using the IU subscale of the OBQ-87; participants
showed significant post-manipulation differences, controlling for initial IU levels.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation for altering participants’
perceptions about their IU levels, participants were asked to answer a question about how much
they believed the feedback they received. Because a direct question about a participant’s view of
their IU might arouse suspicion, participants were asked, “To what extent did you feel that the
intolerance of uncertainty feedback you received was characteristic of you?” on a scale ranging
from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 7 (very characteristic of me). This manipulation check
is identical to the one used by Rosen and Knäuper (2009). Following the IU manipulation and
manipulation check, participants completed the IUI-A, PSWQ, and OBQ-87 on the computer.
Participants then completed a delayed matching-to-sample computerized task designed to
measure checking behavior (Rotge et al., 2008). The computerized task consists of six phases:
(1) participants are presented a large black dot for 2 seconds on the screen to signal attention; (2)
participants are presented with an image for 3.5 seconds; (3) the image disappears and there is a
3.5-second delay; (4) participants are presented with another image and must decide if it is
different than the original image presented by pressing a button corresponding to the choice True
(T) or False (F); (5) participants may press the left arrow to return to the study phase an
unlimited number of times or validate their choice by pressing the right arrow; and (6) once
participants are finished checking, they receive a signal onscreen that tells them whether they
were correct or incorrect. Following the protocol of Rotge et al. (2008), participants were given
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an explanation of the task and 10 practice trials to complete to ensure understanding of the task.
Participants were instructed to proceed “as efficiently and accurately as possible” (Rotge et al.,
2008, p. 468). The actual task consisted of 50 trials, involving 25 pairs of matching stimuli and
25 pairs of non-matching stimuli. See Figure 1 for example of non-matching stimuli.

Figure 1. Example of non-matching checking task stimuli
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Following the computerized task, all participants were debriefed verbally and using a written
document, and given a list of counseling resources in the area that they can utilize in the event of
distress. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of the procedure steps.

Figure 2. Study Procedure

CHAPTER 3
STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses

All analyses were conducted using SPSS 21.0. Data were screened and participants who
did not meet study criteria were removed from analysis. Next, missing data were analyzed using
Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988). Due to the small amount and random pattern of missing data,
the Expectation Maximization (EM) method was used to improve statistical power (Enders,
2001). EM is an item-level, two-step imputation procedure which computes a conditional
dataset, initial covariation matrix, and mean vector utilizing the EM algorithm in the first step,
and calculates maximum likelihood estimate of the covariation matrix and mean vector in the
second step (Enders, 2001). The steps are repeated until the covariation matrices of both steps
converge. For the current study, all datasets converged in under 40 iterations, the standard
number of iterations before the EM algorithm levels off (Neal & Hinton, 1998).
Data from the E-Prime program were exported and merged. The first ten trials of each
participant’s data were removed from analysis, consistent with the procedure used by Rotge et al.
(2008). Total checks were then counted as the number of checks the participant completed
during the last 50 trials. Response time was measured as the average number of seconds from
when the matching image appeared to when the participant made a choice for the first time over
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the last 50 trials. Accuracy was determined as the total number of correct response items
selected, subtracting number of checks.
Next, data were analyzed to detect the presence of univariate outliers, defined as 3 SD
from the mean (Field, 2009). Outliers were visually inspected utilizing boxplots and Q-Q plots,
and identified employing linear regression statistics (e.g., studentized deleted residuals). Data
were also analyzed to determine if they met the assumptions of parametric testing. To test for the
normality of the distribution, skew and kurtosis values were calculated for each variable and
transformed into z-scores. Variables that were significantly non-normal (i.e., z-scores greater
than 2.58; Field, 2009) were logarithmically transformed. Variance was tested for homogenous
spread across the predictor variable using Levene’s test. Descriptive statistics (mean, standard
deviation, and psychometric properties when applicable) were calculated for all dependent
variables. Zero-order correlations were calculated for the OBQ-87 to examine for specificity
among dysfunctional beliefs. A series of ANOVAs were conducted to determine if conditions
differed on any demographic variables, baseline IU, or levels of socially desirable responding.

Primary Analyses

The data were analyzed to determine if the manipulation was successful. A paired
samples t test was conducted to examine IU differences from baseline to post-manipulation. High
IU and low IU conditions were compared with an independent samples t test on IUI-A scores
post-manipulation.
To test the hypothesis that participants manipulated to endorse higher IU would
demonstrate a greater number of checks than participants manipulated to endorse lower IU
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(Hypothesis 1), an independent samples t test was conducted. Significant differences (p < .05)
between conditions on the number of checks completed by participants during the computerized
checking task would suggest that the IU manipulation altered levels of checking behavior.
To test the hypothesis that participants manipulated to endorse higher IU would
demonstrate greater response time on the checking task than participants manipulated to endorse
lower IU (Hypothesis 2), an independent samples t test was conducted. Significant differences (p
< .05) between conditions on the average number of seconds from when the matching image
appeared to when the participants made a choice for the first time would suggest that the IU
manipulation altered response time.
To test whether participants manipulated to endorse higher IU would demonstrate similar
accuracy to participants manipulated to endorse lower IU (Hypothesis 3), an independent
samples t test was conducted. Non-significant differences (p > .05) between conditions on the
total number of correct responses on the computerized checking task would indicate that neither
condition was more accurate than the other.
To test whether participants manipulated to endorse higher IU would demonstrate greater
estimation of threat for future negative events than participants manipulated to endorse lower IU
(Hypothesis 4), an independent samples t test was conducted. Significant differences (p < .05)
between conditions on the OBQ-T would indicate that the IU manipulation altered levels of
threat estimation.
To test whether participants manipulated to endorse higher IU would demonstrate greater
worry than participants manipulated to endorse lower IU (Hypothesis 5), an independent samples
t test was conducted. Significant differences (p < .05) between conditions on PSWQ scores
would suggest that the IU manipulation altered levels of worry.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

Data Screening

A missing values analysis determined that .06% of data were missing from this dataset.
Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988) revealed that the data were missing completely at random (χ2 =
396.242, df = 6202, p = 1.0). Patterns of missing values indicated that monotonicity was not
present, meaning that the monotone method of imputation was not necessary. Participants with
more than 5% missing data on a single measure were excluded pairwise from analysis. All but
one dataset converged after 25 iterations, and that dataset converged within 40 iterations. Next,
total scores were created from questionnaire items and data were analyzed for univariate outliers.
No outliers were found on any measures. Data were not significantly skewed or kurtotic (e.g.,
skew and kurtosis < 2.58; Field, 2009), and met the assumption of normality and homogeneity of
variance.
From the computerized checking task data, both the accuracy variable and the response
time variable met the assumption of normality and were not significantly skewed or kurtotic. The
total checks variable had three outliers and demonstrated a significantly positively skewed,
leptokurtic distribution (skew = 7.82, kurtosis = 7.53). The total checks variable was
logarithmically transformed to reduce positive skew (resulting skew = .67, kurtosis = .51). All
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data met the assumption of homogeneity of variance (i.e., Levene’s test indicated that variation
in responding was not significantly different across conditions on these variables).

Preliminary Analyses

See Table 1 for sample characteristics and baseline comparisons. To test for baseline
differences between the high and low IU conditions, a series of one-way ANOVAs was run on
each pre-manipulation variable (sex, race, ethnicity, vision, treatment history, BIDR-SDE,
BIDR-IM). The conditions did not differ significantly on any baseline variable, and therefore
none was used as a covariate. Participants in the high IU and low IU conditions were excluded
from analysis if they did not believe the feedback (i.e. scoring a 3 or lower on the manipulation
check question; n = 29 in the high condition; n = 4 in the low condition) or if they answered too
many or too few of the true/false IUS manipulation questions and subsequently received
incorrect feedback (n = 3). A series of one-way ANOVAs was employed to examine whether
individuals who did not believe the feedback differed on any outcome variable; results indicated
that those who did not believe the feedback had significantly lower PSWQ scores (F(1, 111) = 8.79,
p < .05.

Table 1
Sample characteristics and baseline comparisons between high and low IU conditions
High IU
Low IU
Total Sample
Variable
n
M (%) SD
n
M (%) SD
N
M (%) SD
F df p
IUI-A Time 1
39
41.5
11.2
43
36.9 10.7
82 39.1
11.7 3.63 1 .06
BIDR-SDE
40
5.4
3.7
43
5.4
3.2
83
5.4
3.4
.19 1 .66
BIDR-IM
40
5.7
3.4
43
4.8
6.2
83
5.3
9.1 1.13 1 .29
Age
40
19.3
1.6
43
19.4
2.1
83 19.3
1.9
.65 1 .42
Sex
.16 1 .68
Female
25
(62.5)
25
58.1
50 60.2
Male
15
(37.5)
18
41.9
33 39.8
Race
.75 1 .38
White/Caucasian
17
(42.5)
20
(46.5)
37 (44.6)
Black/African
16
(40.0)
10
(23.3)
26 (31.3)
American
Asian/Asian American
1
(2.5)
4
(9.3)
5 (6.0)
Native American
0
(0.0)
1
(2.3)
1 (1.2)
Multi-racial
4
(10.0)
1
(2.3)
5 (6.0)
Other
1
(2.5)
6
(14.0)
7 (8.4)
Decline to Answer
1
(2.5)
1
(2.3)
2 (2.4)
Ethnicity
1.87 1 .17
Hispanic
4
(10.0)
9
(20.9)
13 (15.6)
Non-Hispanic
36
(90.0)
34
(79.1)
70 (84.3)
Glasses
40
57.5
43
(65.1)
83 (61.4)
.49 1 .48
Tx history
39
15.0
43
(11.6)
82 (15.4)
.02 1 .89
Note. IUI-A = Intolerance of Uncertainty Inventory, part A; BIDR = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; SDE =
self-deceptive enhancement scale; IM = impression management scale; Glasses = individuals who wear glasses/contact
lenses; Tx history = history of psychological treatment.
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Descriptive statistics are reported for the total sample (Table 2) and by condition
(Table 3). The median value for internal consistency was α = .88. The PSWQ, OBQ-T, and IUIA all had acceptable reliabilities, with Cronbach’s α at least .845. The current sample had similar
means and ranges on the PSWQ, OBQ-T, and IUI-A to student samples in the extant literature.
For example, Meyer et al. (1990) found PSWQ total sample means of 48.8-53.7 (SDs = 12.7 –
14.2); the current study found a total sample mean of 52.6. The BIDR scales evidenced relatively
lower internal consistency; the BIDR-IM scale was below the typical estimates of internal
consistency reported by Paulhus whereas the BIDR-SDE scale was on the lower end of published
estimates (i.e., Paulhus reported estimates of .77-.85 and .67-.77, respectively; 1988).
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Table 2
Internal consistency and descriptive statistics (total sample)
Scale (# of items) N
M
SD
Possible Range Obtained Range
α
AIC
PSWQ (15)
83
52.62 12.83 16 - 80
24 - 80
.92 .40
IUI-A Time 1 (15) 82
39.13 11.79 15 - 75
15 - 63
.91 .41
IUI-A Time 2 (15) 83
39.21 11.61 15 - 75
15 - 66
.92 .46
OBQ-87 (87)
83
265.00 73.07 87 - 609
99 - 448
OBQ-T (14)
81
39.25 13.40 14 - 119
14 - 72
.84 .28
BIDR-SDE c (20) 83
85.57 11.63 20 - 140
51 - 113
.65 .09
BIDR-SDE d (20) 83
5.45
3.44
0 - 20
0 - 14
.71 .11
BIDR-IM c (20)
83
76.19 14.53 20 - 140
34 - 112
.72 .11
BIDR-IM d (20)
83
5.31
9.06
0 - 20
0 - 13
.67 .08
Accuracy (%)
83
69.49
8.58
0 - 100
24 - 43
Total Checks
79
6.51
9.98
0 - 45
Response Time (s) 82
2.84
.86
1.2 - 5.3
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; IUI-A = Intolerance of Uncertainty Inventory,
part A; OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; OBQ-T = OBQ threat estimation subscale;
BIDR = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; SDE = self-deceptive enhancement
scale; IM = impression management scale; c = continuous scoring; d = dichotomous scoring;
AIC= average inter-item correlation.

Table 3
Internal consistency and descriptive statistics (by condition)
High IU
Low IU
Scale (# of items)
n
M
SD
Range
α
AIC
n
M
SD
Range
α
AIC
PSWQ (15)
40
55.83 12.83 25 - 80
.92 .38
43 49.63 12.23
24 - 75
.91 .39
IUI-A Time 1 (15)
39
41.57 12.35 25 - 61
.90 .38
43 36.93 10.72
15 - 63
.91 .41
IUI-A Time 2 (15)
40
43.78 11.68 15 - 66
.92 .45
43 34.96 9.92
16 - 60
.90 .39
OBQ-87 (87)
39 271.59 73.14 99 - 448
42 258.88 67.33 133 - 398
OBQ-T (14)
39
40.94 14.67 14 - 72
.86 .30
42 37.68 12.07
20 - 60
.82 .25
BIDR-SDE c (20)
40
85.69 11.69 51 - 113 .64 .08
43 85.46 11.72
64 - 108 .67 .09
BIDR-SDE d (20)
40
5.42 3.71
0 - 14
.75 .13
43
5.48 3.22
0 - 13
.69 .09
BIDR-IM c (20)
40
78.66 15.19 45 - 112 .74 .13
43 73.87 13.66
34 - 105 .70 .11
BIDR-IM d (20)
40
5.76 3.44
0 - 13
.75 .12
43
4.89 6.22
0 - 10
.55 .06
Accuracy (%)
40
70.00 9.30 48 - 86
43 68.90 9.30
48 - 82
Total Checks
38
5.70 9.98
0 - 45
42
7.28 9.98
0 - 38
Response Time (s)
40
2.70
.86 1.2 - 4.3
42
2.98
.86 1.6 - 5.4
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; IUI-A = Intolerance of Uncertainty Inventory, part A; OBQ = Obsessive
Beliefs Questionnaire; OBQ-T = OBQ threat estimation subscale; BIDR = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; SDE
= self-deceptive enhancement scale; IM = impression management scale; c = continuous scoring; d = dichotomous scoring;
AIC= average inter-item correlation.
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Table 4 presents zero-order intercorrelations among the OBQ-87 subscales. All subscales were
significantly (p < .01) intercorrelated, which is consistent with the published literature (OCCWG,
2003). It is notable that the intercorrelations among all of the OBQ-87 subscales were at or above
.60, with three of the intercorrelations above .80, indicating that the constructs some of the scales
are measuring may not be distinct. Because the OBQ-T and OBQ-IU were highly correlated (r =
.74), it may be an indicator that the scales are not measuring well-differentiated beliefs, and
therefore it becomes relatively more difficult to determine the unique contribution of each
variable.
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Table 4
Zero-order intercorrelations among OBQ-87 subscales in the total sample
Subscale
1.
2.
1. Threat Estimation
2. Perfectionism
.72
3. Responsibility
.65
.61
4. Importance of Thoughts
.79
.67
5. Control of Thoughts
.81
.63
6. Intolerance of Uncertainty .74
.66
Note. N = 81; All values are significant at p < .01.

3.

4.

5.

.62
.62
.63

.81
.66

.81
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Primary Analyses

A paired samples t test was conducted to examine condition scores on the IUI-A from
baseline to post-manipulation. Results indicated that there were no significant changes from pre
to posttest in the high IU condition (t(38) = -1.13, p = .26), but the direction of the effect was as
predicted (i.e., IU scores increased). Significant reductions in IU were found in the low IU
condition (t(42) = 2.49, p = .01). An independent samples t test revealed a significant effect of
condition on IUI-A time 2 scores (t(80) = 3.711, p < .001, d = .80), but not IUI-A time 1 scores
(t(80) = 1.91, p = .06, d = .42). Overall, IU was significantly altered, but only for the low
condition. The combination of condition IU differences at Time 1 in addition to reductions in IU
for the low condition may be driving the significant post-manipulation Time 2 results. These
results indicate that the manipulation was only partially successful. When participants who did
not believe the manipulation (i.e. those individuals scoring a 3 or lower on the manipulation
check) were retained in the analysis, no significant changes were found from baseline to postmanipulation in the high condition (t(70) = .178, p = .86) or low condition (t(48) = .425, p = .67),
nor were there any differences between conditions on IUI-A time 1 scores (t(118) = 1.26, p = .21,
d = .23) or IUI-A Time 2 scores (t(118) = 1.38, p = .17, d = .25).
To test the first hypothesis, an independent samples t test was conducted between the
high and low conditions on the number of checks variables. Participants did not evidence
significantly different checking behavior (t(77) = -.728, p = .46). With the outliers retained, the
results were similarly non-significant (t(80) = -.40, p = .69). These results do not support
Hypothesis 1, which proposed that participants in the high IU condition would check more than
participants in the low IU condition.
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Participants did not spend longer making a choice on the checking task whether they
were in the high or low IU condition (t(80) = -1.51, p = .14). This does not support Hypothesis 2,
which proposed that participants in the high IU condition would display greater response times
than participants in the low IU condition.
Participants in the high IU condition did not differ significantly from participants in the
low IU condition in terms of accuracy (t(80) = .601, p = .55). These results support Hypothesis 3,
that there would be no differences in accuracy between conditions.
The high and low IU conditions did not differ significantly on OBQ-T scores (t(81) = 1.08,
p = .283). These results do not support Hypothesis 4, which proposed that participants in the high
IU condition would display greater levels of threat estimation than participants in the low IU
condition.
Participants differed significantly in their worry scores (t(81) = 2.25, p = .027).
Participants in the high IU condition had higher worry scores (M = 55.83, SD = 12.83) than
participants manipulated to endorse lower levels of IU (M = 49.63, SD = 12.23). These results
offer support for Hypothesis 5.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

The primary goal of this study was to examine the effects of IU on threat estimation,
worry, and checking behavior to further clarify its relationship with OCD. In essence, this study
sought to examine the effects of experimentally manipulated IU on checking behavior in a
student sample. Although IU has been conceptualized as a contributing factor in OCD, there is a
dearth of experimental research available and the research that does exist is almost entirely in the
context of GAD. Additionally, there is mixed experimental evidence linking IU to checking
behavior and threat estimation.
The current results suggest that IU was partially manipulated using a false feedback
experimental paradigm. Results indicated that the majority of participants believed false
feedback about their level of IU based on an altered questionnaire and that IU scores in the high
condition (M = 43.7) were significantly higher than the low condition (M = 35.6). These results
replicate previous studies utilizing this manipulation that found significant condition differences
on a measure of IU following the manipulation (i.e., Bailey, Fergus, & Wu, 2013; Rosen &
Knäuper, 2009). In particular, the IU manipulation significantly decreased IU in the low
condition, although it did not significantly increase IU in the high condition. Condition
differences in baseline IU (although non-significantly different) appear to have contributed to
post-manipulation IU differences. Although the false feedback, rated on a 7-point scale, was
considered “similarly characteristic” of participants in the high condition (M = 5.33, SD = 1.09)
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and the low condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.03), it may be that the high IU manipulation was not
manipulating IU as effectively or in the same way as was the low IU condition, especially given
the number of participants who did not believe the feedback in the high condition. This pattern of
findings is inconsistent with previous studies utilizing this manipulation, in which IU scores were
significantly increased and decreased for the respective IU conditions.
Additionally, this study extended previous research by examining the effects of
manipulated IU on a delayed matching-to-sample task designed to measure analog checking
behavior. Whereas a number of studies have used behavioral checking measures, such as noting
errors in a math-based text (MacDonald & Davey, 2005), or using virtual reality to check a stove
(e.g., Kim et al., 2009; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003), the current task was selected as a low-cost,
believable, and easily implemented measure for a college student population.
The primary aim of this study was to determine the effect of IU on checking behavior.
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the manipulation did not have a significant effect on amount of
checking completed. That is, participants performed a similar number of checks during the
checking task regardless of their level of IU. One possible explanation for this finding is that the
IU manipulation did not provide a strong enough “dose” to elicit significant alterations in
checking behavior. The range of number of checks for 50 trials was large (0-45), but the modal
number of checks was 0, which could be an indication of participant apathy. Additionally, the
mean number of checks in the current sample (M = 6.5) was far below that of the Rotge et al.
(2008) sample of OC checkers (M = 14.75). Although this checking task was successful at
distinguishing OC checkers from OC non-checkers in a clinical sample, the current IU
manipulation may not have been powerful enough to elicit significantly different checking
behavior in a student sample, in which the majority of individuals do not display high levels of

55
OC cognitive vulnerabilities. The OBQ-44 scores in this sample (M = 140.0, SD = 37.4) were
consistent with other student samples, but below that of a clinical sample (M = 164.3, SD = 50.2;
OCCWG, 2003), which may have resulted in less checking on the checking task.
Similarly, and contrary to Hypothesis 2, participants did not differ as to time spent on the
checking task. That is, participants spent a similar amount of time deciding whether the second
picture matched the first picture regardless of their IU level. As noted above, this lack of
difference could be due to the IU manipulation not providing enough “dose” to have a
meaningful impact on behavior. It also could indicate that individuals with checking
compulsions do not differ from the general population with regard to the amount of time spent to
make a check, but rather spend more time on a task overall due to the sheer number of
verifications they make. For example, it may take an individual with OCD the same amount of
time as an individual without OCD to verify that a door is locked; however, the individual with
OCD may spend more time overall due to making more checks. A final possibility is that only
clinical levels of checking behavior elicit greater response time. In Rotge et al. (2008),
individuals with checking OCD differed significantly from non-anxious controls on response
time during the checking task, regardless of number of checks completed. In the current student
sample, it is possible that subclinical levels of checking behavior may not have elicited greater
response time.
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that participants would not differ significantly with regard
to the number of items they correctly matched, was corroborated by the data. Although memory
deficits have been theorized to play a role in compulsive checking (Sher, Frost, & Otto, 1983)
the current finding supports more recent literature that memory or task accuracy is not reduced in
individuals with higher IU. It may be that meta-memory, rather than actual memory capacity, is
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distorted in individuals with OCD (e.g., Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado, & Lavoie, 2014). That is,
checking behavior may be a result of distorted perceptions of one’s view of his or her memory
capacity. An evaluation of meta-memory was not included in this study, but it is possible that
individuals in the high IU condition may have endorsed lower memory capacity than individuals
in the low IU condition, despite similar accuracy scores. Future studies may wish to examine this
hypothesis.
The second aim of this study was to determine the effect of experimentally manipulated
IU on threat estimation. However, Hypothesis 4, that threat estimation would be significantly
different between conditions following the IU manipulation, was not supported. This result could
be due to several factors. First, as noted, when this study was designed there were no known
measures of state threat estimation. Therefore, the OBQ-87 threat estimation subscale was used
despite being a trait measure (i.e., the instructions read, “To decide whether a given statement is
typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like most of the
time.”). Had a state measure been available or state instructions used, participants may have been
more likely to endorse greater levels of threat estimation in response to the manipulation.
Additionally, the OBQ-T and IU subscales were highly correlated in the present study (r = .74),
indicating that the constructs being measured may not be distinct. Although the intercorrelation
in the current study is below that of the OCCWG’s (2003; r = .85), it displays a high level of
overlap across these dimensions. The IU manipulation, not developed in the context of OCD,
may not have affected scores on the OBQ subscales in the predicted direction, particularly if IU
as it is conceptualized in the OCD literature was not being adequately manipulated. The OBQ-T,
rather than the OBQ-44 RT, was included in this study as a way to examine the specific content
of threat estimation on specific OC symptoms (i.e., checking) without the influence of
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responsibility, but the use of this subscale may have come at the cost of reduced validity. When
participants who did not check were removed from analysis, condition significantly predicted
threat estimation (i.e., individuals in the high condition endorsed higher levels of threat
estimation, t(57) = 2.51, p = .01) but no other variables. Participants who checked on the checking
task were more likely to endorse higher threat estimation in the high condition and lower threat
estimation in the low condition, consistent with Hypothesis 4.
The final aim of the study was to determine if IU is associated with worry. This study
sought to examine whether conditions would differ on worry scores as a result of their IU levels
(Hypothesis 5). The results corroborate both correlational and experimental literature that IU and
worry are closely related and support cognitive-behavioral models of IU as an essential
component of worry (Dugas et al., 1998). Specifically, the high IU condition endorsed
significantly greater levels of worry than the low IU condition. In addition, in this study PSWQ
scores were significantly correlated with IUI-A time 2 scores (r = .55, p < .001), further
supporting the association between the two constructs. The inclusion of a measure of worry in
this study primarily was for the purpose of assessing IU as a construct. That is, because this
study found that individuals with higher levels of IU have higher worry scores, it is one
indication that this study manipulated a similar construct that is being examined in the GAD
literature, and adds support to the theory that IU causes worry. However, it is important to note
that worry only was assessed at one time point in this study. To further support the theory that IU
leads to worry, future studies should assess worry at multiple time points to evaluate change over
time as a result of changes in IU.
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Limitations and Future Directions

The current study replicated and extended the OC literature by providing information
about the use of a modified questionnaire to manipulate dysfunctional beliefs, the use of a
computerized checking task to measure checking behavior, and the relationship between IU and
checking, worry, and threat estimation. However, this study is not without limitations.
Unfortunately, it appears that the experimental manipulation was only partially successful; IU
was significantly reduced for the low condition but was not significantly increased in the high
condition. As such, it may be possible that the manipulation was not in fact altering IU or not
altering it as intended. It is possible, for example, that beliefs about IU may have been
manipulated, rather than IU itself. This may be particularly true for the high IU condition, which
did not evidence significant changes in pre to post IUI-A scores and in which a large number of
participants did not believe the feedback. The possibility that the feedback may not have been
wholly consistent with OCCWG’s (1997) definition of IU also should be considered. For
example, in the high condition, participants read about unfairness (“You feel that being uncertain
is unfair and can lead to the inability to take action”) when that is not one of the core features of
OCCWG’s three-part definition. Because the manipulation was not developed in the context of
OCD, it may not have effectively manipulated an OC-relevant belief in the current study.
Further, some items on the IUI-A may have been confusing for some participants (e.g. “I do not
really tolerate situations in which I do not know what is going to happen”), which may have
skewed some of the results.
Moreover, although conditions differed significantly on IUI-A time 2 scores, there were
no significant differences on OBQ-87 IU scores (t(81) = 1.59, p > .05) which suggests that the IU
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manipulation altered beliefs about the unacceptability of uncertainty more than beliefs about
one’s coping abilities or ability to function in ambiguous situations. It is unsurprising then, that
threat estimation was not affected by the IU manipulation, given the high correlation with OBQ87 IU subscale. If the IU constructs are defined somewhat differently in the respective contexts
of OCD and GAD, then OC-relevant outcomes may not have been affected by a GAD-influenced
manipulation. The primary GAD-relevant outcome assessed in this study—worry—was
significantly different between conditions. Future research may consider altering the current
manipulation to encompass beliefs about the inability to cope in the face of unpredictable change
or inadequate functioning when confronted with ambiguity. Further, it may be important to
reconcile the disparate definitions in the OCD and GAD literatures to help ease non-specificity in
future studies.
It is possible—in fact, likely—that other factors play a role in checking behavior other
than IU. For example, uncomfortable sensations of things being not quite right (Not Just Right
Experiences, NJRE; Coles et al., 2003) may drive an individual to check until the sensation is
gone. NJRE have been correlated with checking behavior in a student sample (Coles et al.,
2003). It is possible that for some individuals, checking does not occur because of a fear of harm,
but rather to increase feelings that everything is where it should be; instead of reducing feelings
of doubt, checking behavior may be a result of feelings of incompleteness. However, it has been
suggested that attitudes about NJRE, rather than NJRE themselves, lead to greater levels of
checking behavior (Fergus, 2014). For example, research has found that although the majority of
students endorse having experienced NJRE in the past month, they do not tend to find NJRE
distressing (Coles et al., 2003). Beliefs about need for certainty or perfectionism may be the
driving factors in the relationship between NJRE and the onset of compulsive behavior. By
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reducing IU, it may be possible to decrease distress of NJRE and, in turn, diminish checking
behavior. Further, like IU, NJRE are strongly correlated with worry and other symptoms of GAD
(Fergus, 2014). Future studies may wish to develop more complex models to assess how the
presence of IU and NJRE may lead to the manifestation of specific disorders such as OCD and
GAD.
It also is important to note that none of the available studies that have employed this IU
manipulation used the same measure of IU. For example, the current study measured IU with the
IUI-A; Bailey, Fergus, and Wu (2013) measured IU with the OBQ-87; and Rosen and Knäuper
(2009) used an unaltered version of the IUS (the manipulation questionnaire) to assess IU scores
following the manipulation. For the purposes of this study, a state measure of IU may have more
accurately measured the effects of the manipulation. However, nearly all known measures
examine IU as a trait-like, trans-situational concept. Future studies may wish to conceptualize IU
as more state-like or situation-specific variable, particularly for student samples that may
evidence range restriction on the current trait measures.
In this study, the estimates of internal consistency for the BIDR were lower than
expected, given previous estimates of these scales (e.g., Paulhus, 1988). The range of scores for
the BIDR scales in the current sample (0-15) demonstrated a relative floor effect and may
indicate that participants were less likely to endorse certain items. Moreover, in the low
condition, none of the participants endorsed the item (“I never swear”) as “very true,” leading all
responses on that item to be coded as “0” and removed from the reliability analysis due to zero
item variance. The scoring system used by the BIDR also may have contributed to inconsistency
in this sample. By dichotomizing all responses “5” and below into 0s and all responses “6” and
above into 1s, some of the variance of the item responses was removed, which may have
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contributed to negative item correlations. It is notable that although Paulhus (1988)
recommended that dichotomous scoring be used, others have argued that the continuous scoring
procedure provides a better estimate of socially desirable responding because: (1) socially
desirable responding may not be an “all or nothing” process, (2) it captures individuals who may
not endorse extreme ends of the scale but have a tendency toward desirable responding, and (3)
dichotomous scoring may lead to a loss of information, thereby reducing reliability and validity
(Stöber, Dette, & Musch, 2002). When continuous scoring was used, the BIDR-IM scale
displayed higher reliability (α = .72) whereas the BIDR-SDE displayed slightly lower reliability
(α = .65). The BIDR-IM scale in particular evidenced very low inter-item correlations, indicating
that it likely was not measuring a unidimensional construct. This scale appears to be influenced
by certain items that may not be applicable to a college student population (e.g., the item “I
always declare everything at customs” was negatively correlated with the other items). The
continuous scoring procedure was implemented as a potential resolution for some of the scoring
concerns; however, in the total sample internal consistency improved only for the IM scale. In
the current study, the BIDR appeared to provide a poor estimate of socially desirable responding
and may not have been measuring what it was intended to measure.
Another study limitation is the lack of a clinical sample. Although student samples can
provide useful information when examining preliminary hypotheses regarding psychological
symptoms, they are limited in several ways. For example, it is unlikely that they were motivated
to complete the checking task as would a clinical sample. The effort level of each participant
during the computerized checking task was not measured, and the length of the study (1.5 hours)
may have increased fatigue toward the end when participating in the checking task, thereby
reducing overall engagement in the study in an effort to finish sooner. Finally, several unforeseen
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environmental factors (e.g., drilling noises, power outages during data collection) may have
reduced some participants’ ability to concentrate on the checking task.
Relatedly, several procedural decisions regarding the IU manipulation may have affected
the outcome of the study. During the IU manipulation, participants were asked to first read a
paragraph about IU research, after which they completed the modified questionnaire and then
read a paragraph about their results. It is impossible to know if participants read or understood
the false-feedback they received. In an effort to replicate Rosen and Knäuper’s (2009)
manipulation as closely as possible, fake references were included in both the informational and
feedback IU paragraphs. However, the inclusion of these fake references may have confused
participants, taking their attention away from the actual content of the paragraph. In addition, for
many students in introductory psychology, it is their first or second semester in college. The
informational items may have been at a reading level too high for this sample; an analysis of the
text using the Flesch-Kincaid readability test formula (Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers, & Chissom,
1975) resulted in a reading ease score of 34.6 (“difficult to read”) and a grade level score of 13.2.
Though the reading levels of NIU’s incoming freshman may be at or above this threshold, a less
difficult text may have mitigated some of these concerns, especially in the context of research
participation when attention may be low. Finally, it also should be noted that both the high and
low false-feedback items were included on the same page, and it was the participants’
responsibility to read the correct one. Although participants indicated in writing which paragraph
they read, it is possible that some may have read the wrong paragraph, or read both, thereby
reducing some of the potency of the task.
Although the current study used a low-cost and easy-to-implement task to measure
checking behavior, the task (as stimuli themselves) may have affected the current outcomes. For
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example, the images used in the Rotge et al. (2008) study were inconsistent in terms of
complexity, and some images may have been easier for participants to correctly identify, thereby
negating the need for many checks. Rotge et al. (2008) updated the task in a 2013 study by
utilizing checkerboards. However, the checkerboards, consisting of 100 squares with one square
misplaced in the non-matching sets, appeared to be extremely difficult to use in a delayed
matching-to-sample paradigm; the decision to not use the updated stimuli was based on the
concern that doing so may have increased frustration and boredom in the current student sample.
Related, there was no tangible consequence for not checking during the task. Although
participants were given feedback about whether they had answered correctly, their overall
accuracy on the task had no bearing on whether they would obtain course credit. Perhaps the lack
of importance involved in this task incited participants to check less than they would with a task
they deemed more meaningful. Checking tasks tend to be more successful when tasks are
meaningful or when there are consequences for failure to check (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010);
although this is inherently difficult to achieve, future studies may aim to incorporate meaningful
incentives or genuine consequences within checking tasks.
Another procedural decision that may have affected findings was the inclusion of 60
trials in the computerized checking task. In the current study, 60 trials were used for several
reasons; the first ten trials were considered “practice trials” where participants learned to use the
computer program (and thus these trials were removed from analysis), and more trials lessened
the impact of the non-uniformity of the image complexity. Although the previous studies
employed the same number of trials during the task (e.g., Lambrecq et al., 2014; Rotge et al.,
2008), these studies also used clinical samples that may have been more highly motivated to
perform well on the task. For the current student sample, the checking task length averaged 22.5

64
minutes (range = 17.8-66.0 minutes). The number of trials may have increased fatigue and
frustration, thereby confounding the effects of the IU manipulation. Future studies may wish to
assess the possibility of gaining an accurate assessment of checking with fewer trials.
Limitations notwithstanding, the current study provides a basis upon which future
research can build. Future studies could examine other individual difference variables, such as
perfectionism or NJRE, to determine if they have an influence on checking behavior.
Additionally, future studies could streamline the IU manipulation and checking task to reduce the
potential for participant fatigue or confusion. For example, the information about IU and
subsequent feedback could be read aloud to participants to ensure contact with the material as
well as offer the potential to clarify any questions. Alternatively, vignettes about IU—similar to
those used in Kelly (2009)—may provide a more powerful “dose” of IU than the current
manipulation and should be considered. The current study used a low-responsibility task that
may not have had a significant effect on participant behavior. Future studies may consider taking
steps to make checking tasks more meaningful for participants or providing an incentive for
increased checking behaviors (e.g. being entered into a raffle for getting a certain number of
items correct). As a preliminary experiment examining the causal effects of IU on checking
behavior, the current study incorporated relatively few outcome variables. Future studies may
wish to consider more complex models. For example, it may be that inflated responsibility leads
to checking compulsions, but only through IU. A study utilizing a similar student sample found
that IU, as measured by the OBQ-87, mediated the relationship between perfectionism and
checking symptoms as measured by the Schedule of Compulsions, Obsession, and Pathological
Impulses ([SCOPI] Watson & Wu, 2005; Faleer, Bailey, Rogers, & Wu, 2014). That study
focused on questionnaire data, but it suggests that interactions between dysfunctional beliefs may
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be likely paths from beliefs to compulsions. Another avenue for investigation may be to assess
whether IU is causally linked to other OC compulsions, such as cleaning or ordering. Finally, for
the multiple reasons noted, future studies would benefit from utilizing a clinical sample.

Conclusions

Although further research on IU in a clinical sample is needed, the current study
examined the relationship between a cognitive vulnerability factor and behavioral outcomes.
Currently, the majority of research on IU is correlational and the current experimental procedure
improves upon existing research designs and answers the call for more investigations into IU as a
causal risk factor for specific anxiety disorders and OCD. Although the hypotheses regarding
checking behaviors and IU were not supported, the current study provides a foundation for future
studies seeking to experimentally manipulate cognitive vulnerabilities or assess compulsions
through behavioral measures.
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
I agree to participate in the research project titled “Picture Perception” being conducted by
Hannah Faleer, a graduate student at Northern Illinois University (NIU). I have been informed
that the purpose of this study is to learn about how students perceive images on the computer.
I understand that if I agree to participate in this study, I first will be asked to complete
questionnaires related to demographics, and thoughts and feelings I may have experienced. Next
I will be asked to complete a computerized task, which will require my full effort and
concentration. In total, this study will require approximately 90 minutes of my time.
I have been informed that potential risks and/or discomforts I could experience during this study
include finding some of the questionnaire items to ask about sensitive information. Additionally,
I may experience momentary distress or discomfort during the assessments or behavioral tasks.
Feedback regarding my performance on the computerized task may also cause minor distress. As
such, although I am encouraged to answer all questions and participate to the best of my ability
in each part of the study, I may omit any questions that I do not wish to answer, decline to
complete any task, and/or discontinue participation at any time.
I understand that all information gathered during this study will be kept confidential and that my
name or personal identifier will not appear on any of the data forms. After PSYC 102 credit has
been assigned, all information that could identify me will be removed from the data. I have been
informed that any subsequent presentations or publications that include these data will report
only group-level data.
I understand that there may be no direct benefit to me for participating in this study. Its main
purpose is research. I am aware that my participation in this study is voluntary and may be
withdrawn at any time without penalty, and that if I have additional questions concerning this
study, Hannah Faleer (630-621-6071) or her research advisor, Dr. Kevin Wu (815-753-1605). I
also understand that if I wish to learn about one’s rights as a research participant, I may contact
the NIU Office of Research Compliance at 815-753-8588.
I understand that my consent to participate in this project does not constitute a waiver of any
legal rights or redress I might have as a result of my participation, and I acknowledge that I will
receive a copy of this consent form should I request one.

Signature

Printed Name

Date
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1. What is your sex?
a. Male
b. Female
2. What is your current age? ________years old
3. What is your race? (please circle all that apply)
a. Asian or Asian-American
b. Black or African-American
c. Native American
d. White/Caucasian
e. Multi-racial
f. Other
g. Prefer not to answer
4. Do you self-identify as Hispanic or Latino/Latina?
a. Yes
b. No
5. Do you wear glasses or contact lenses to correct your vision?
a. Yes
b. No
6. Do you have 20/20 vision?
a. Yes, I do not need glasses/contact lenses
b. Yes, when I am wearing glasses/contact lenses
b. No
c. Other (please explain)
7. Are you wearing glasses/contact lenses right now?
a. Yes
b. No, I have them but am not currently wearing them
c. No, I do not need glasses/contact lenses
8. Have you ever been treated by a psychologist or psychiatrist for an emotional problem?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Prefer not to answer
9. Are you currently in psychological or psychiatric treatment?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Prefer not to answer
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Thank you for participating in our study entitled Picture Perception. You were told that
the study involved the perception of pictures on the computer. That was true, but we also wanted
to know whether students would perform differently under different circumstances. Specifically,
we wondered whether students who were told they were highly intolerant of uncertain situations
would work on the task differently. For example, would they check the pictures during the
computerized task more frequently? For this study, the feedback you received about your
tolerance for uncertainty may not have been accurate. That is, it was based on a
predetermined script. A model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suggests that people
who are extremely uncomfortable with uncertain situations will perform “compulsive” checking
behaviors because the unknown situation makes them feel anxious and question themselves. This
study used a computerized matching task to determine whether people who felt greater
discomfort would check more than people who felt less discomfort. We also collected
information from you about your personal characteristics, such as your level of worry and
estimation of threat, in case those variables explain any differences that this study may find. Our
main goal is to better understand who is at risk for OCD symptoms and whether we might detect
them earlier – before symptoms become a problem. Please understand that nearly everyone
endorses some of the questions asked but very few people who go on to have problems
consistent with OCD. For example, many people endorse the questions we asked about
“preferring things to be certain” but it is only when those preferences are (1) very strong and (2)
distressing in daily life that they are a clinical problem. Should you have any concerns about
whether you exhibit such problems, you are encouraged to contact the professionals listed on the
Counseling Resources form made available to you (which is also online at:
http://www.orc.niu.edu/orc/human_research/applications/counseling_resources.pdf). They will
be able to perform a formal clinical assessment of the issues raised in this study.
If you are interested in reading further about this type of research, the following two journal
articles are available either through the NIU Library or from Hannah Faleer (the study’s PI; see
below for her contact information).
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., & Foa, E. B. (2003). Intolerance of uncertainty in obsessivecompulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17, 233–242. doi:10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00182-2
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (1997). Cognitive assessment of obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Behavior Research and Therapy, 35, 667-681. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00017-X

If you have any questions regarding the study, please feel free to contact Hannah Faleer at 630621-6071 or hfaleer1@niu.edu, or Dr. Kevin Wu at 815-753-1605 or kevinwu@niu.edu. Please
do not discuss your experiences in this study since we are planning to continue data collection
during Fall 2014. Too much knowledge about the study will spoil the experience for subsequent
students in your class!

